The imposition of new U.S. rules on the export of advanced semiconductors places Brazil in a precarious position, affecting the country’s technological competition and digital autonomy.
The recent regulation from the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), an agency under the U.S. Department of Commerce, has introduced a new element of instability to Brazil’s technology infrastructure sector.
Published on November 19, 2026, the measure requires specific licenses for the export and transfer of advanced semiconductors to countries such as Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.
In practice, this policy creates a latent competitive imbalance among companies operating on Brazilian soil.
The core of the problem lies in the disparity between market players.
Data center operators whose headquarters or ultimate controllers are located in the United States enjoy a streamlined process, with exemptions and guaranteed predictability.
Conversely, competing firms are at the mercy of Washington’s bureaucracy, facing uncertainty about when they will receive critical equipment.
This scenario not only changes operational costs but also determines who can actually launch a service before the competition.
The strategic impact of controlled scarcity
In the so‑called “chip war,” access to computing accelerators determines a project’s viability.
An operator may have capital, energy, and qualified engineers, but if the supply of essential components is interrupted or delayed due to U.S. national security concerns, the impact is immediate.
Processing capacity shifts from a commodity to a geopolitical power variable.
“The dispute reaches the design of circuits, design tools, manufacturing machines, advanced encapsulation, and data center operations. Countries and companies control distinct stages, and the power to condition one of them can reverberate through all the following stages.”
This logic extends to remote access.
The BIS now conditions data center operations that provide significant computing power for entities linked to nations in the D:5 group, such as China.
This means that even if the hardware is physically installed in Brazil, the use of the machine is monitored by Washington under the justification of preventing sensitive technology from fueling American strategic adversaries.
Challenges to sovereignty and free competition
Against this backdrop, Brazil finds itself at a legal and economic crossroads.
The Federal Constitution, in articles 170 and 173, establishes the defense of free competition and the fight against economic power abuse as pillars of the national order.
Moreover, fostering technological autonomy is a state objective, provided for in articles 218 and 219.
The challenge for bodies such as the Cade (Administrative Council for Economic Defense) will be to discern whether the competitive advantage generated by external policies constitutes anti-competitive practices in the domestic market.
“The question for Cade would arise, for example, if a company with market power used its position to close distribution channels, hinder customer migration, or exclude competitors through contractual practices.”
The situation gains layers of complexity with initiatives such as Redata, which seeks to attract processing infrastructure to Brazil, often colliding with the restrictions imposed by the American standard.
Significant projects, such as Omnia‘s in Pecém, Ceará, demonstrate how Brazilian digital sovereignty is constantly subject to decisions made outside the country’s borders.
The future of this industry will depend on how quickly Brazil can integrate the Brazilian Artificial Intelligence Plan and the Brazil Semiconductor Program into tangible goals.
It is not just about attracting investment, but about ensuring the country has its own processing capacity.
The “Era of Distraction” demands the opposite: rigorous and constant monitoring of where it is manufactured, where it operates, and fundamentally, who controls the data flow that sustains the intelligence of our machines.
